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RECONCILING TORT AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
CONCEPTS OF JUSTICE:
THE CASE OF HISTORICAL WRONGS
Laverne Jacobs*
The response of the Canadian courts to the action in Mack has been disappointing.
... A fully mature legal system recognizes that the judiciary have a duty alongside
the legislature to ensure the proper content of law, and this may in exceptional cases
require them to deny the validity of procedurally sound statutes. Of course, should
a reasonable statutory scheme of compensation be created, the courts would
respect that as replacing the right to restitution for mistake of law. But it would
seem that on both accounts the Canadian system has yet to reach full maturity.
- Julian Rivers'
Why can't the Premier understand that when he puts a price on the most
fundamental of people's rights, he leaves them without any value at all?
- Alberta Hansard, II March 1998
INTRODUCTION
These two quotes reflect a particular situation that metaphorically shackles our
ability to provide satisfactory redress for historical wrongs. On the one hand,
doctrinal interpretations of the rule of law, though technically correct, have rendered
judicial recourse for historical wrongs essentially unfulfilling. Shackling the other
hand are administrative schemes for compensation which, although arguably well
placed to answer the call for adequate compensation, are riddled with such tensions
in their creation and implementation that they often result in unsatisfactory forms of
redress as well. What I propose to do in this article is to explore the question of what
it takes to create the reasonable compensatory scheme to which Julian Rivers alludes
in his work. Specifically, why have our attempts to seek justice through judicial
intervention failed? And what can we learn from past experiences to help ameliorate
our efforts to create appropriate redress through administrative compensation
schemes?
Ph.D Candidate and SSHRC Canada Graduate Scholar, Osgoode Hall Law School; Visiting Scholar,
Cornell University Law School (Spring, 2006) and joining the Faculty of Law, University of Windsor
in 2007. This article was drafted during my appointment as a Visiting Scholar at Cornell University
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Julian Rivers, "Gross Statutory Injustice and the Canadian Head Tax Case" in D. Dyzenhaus & M.
Moran, eds., Calling Power to Account: Law Reparations, and the Chinese Canadian Head Tax Case
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2005) 233 at 251 [emphasis added].
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It is an especially timely moment to explore these questions given the many
compensation claims that the federal government has recently been asked to address.
Among these are claims for redress by Chinese Canadian railway workers who had
been denied immigrant status in Canada between 1885 and 1947 (the "Chinese Head
Tax case"); claims by Ukrainian Canadians who had been interned during World
War I and the ongoing process of trying to provide appropriate redress for Canada's
Aboriginal residential school legacy. Indeed, the recent decision of Baxter v.
Canada,2 decided in December 2006, offers thought-provoking commentary on the
difficult intersection between tort and administrative methods of providing
compensation that can arise with respect to historical wrongs. In Baxter, the Ontario
Superior Court of Justice grappled with some of the problems inherent to having the
government - a face of the author of the original problem - also act as a master of
the compensation process. 3 Baxter and its parallel cases represent the latest chapter
in the Aboriginal residential school class action litigation. In Baxter, the Ontario
Superior Court of Justice approved the proposed settlement of the parties on
condition that certain modifications be made to the procedure planned for
administering the settlement.
The first part of this article provides an overview of the most dominant private
and public law approaches that have been attempted in the courts by plaintiffs
seeking redress for historical wrongs and outlines why these approaches have been
unsuccessful. It also defines the notion of historical wrongs and provides
background information on the two historical wrongs used as a case study in this
paper - Aboriginal residential schools and sexual sterilization in Alberta. In the
second part, I turn to discuss the phenomenon of creating compensation schemes as
an alternative to traditional court action. The delicate treatment that historical
wrongs requires is perhaps most evident in the emotional debates that surround the
setting up of compensatory schemes in their regard. Two illustrative examples are
the outcry surrounding the introduction of a statute to compensate the victims of
sterilization in Alberta and the continuing challenges related to the Aboriginal school
resolution process established by the federal government. An examination of the
compensation schemes that emerged in these two contexts as well as the process of
their emergence provide valuable insight into some of the tensions that can occur
when systems of compensation for victims of historical wrongs are designed. These
tensions include the challenge of determining the appropriate nature and scope of
compensation and dealing appropriately with difficult issues relating to
independence and mistrust that can arise when the author of a historical wrong later
decides to remedy it. I argue that these tensions may be addressed by fostering
continuous dialogue between the government and the victims and through
independent oversight. Finally, I offer some observations on the ways in which
compensatory schemes for historical wrongs expand our traditional conceptions of
administrative justice.
2 Baxter v. Canada (A.G.), [2006] O.J. No. 4968 (Sup. Ct.) [Baxter].
3 Baxter is discussed in greater detail below in Part 1I: Administrative Compensation Schemes; 2)
Determining Appropriate Heads of Damage.
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The idea that historical wrongs require delicate treatment is also the catalyst for
the nuance that must be brought to bear on the aims of this article. Certainly, every
historical wrong will have its own factual and historical specificities that demand
attention in determining how to go about redressing its victims appropriately. It
would be overly ambitious to suggest that the tensions drawn out of the examples
examined in this paper speak definitively to any other situation. Rather than offering
definitive solutions, then, the point of this article is to extract avenues of exploration
that should be considered in the design of compensatory schemes for historical
wrongs - particularly when those wrongs involve human rights violations through
previously valid government action.
PART I: Historical Wrongs in the Courts
A review of the North American legal literature on past human injustice reveals an
almost implicit understanding of the term "historical wrong". The concept has been
used in the Canadian legal literature referring, most notably, to Aboriginal residential
schools, 4 the Chinese Head Tax case, 5 racial internment 6 and forced sexual
sterilization. 7 The idea tends to encompass serious physical, psychological and/or
cultural injuries that have repercussions over several years and which result from the
past creation and implementation of a governmental policy. In the United States,
reparations theorists often view historical wrongs as wrongs imposed by one group
on another for racially motivated reasons. However, the dominant group has not
been conceptually confined to government actors.
8
See e.g. Law Commission of Canada, Minister's Reference on Institutional Child Abuse: Discussion
Paper (Ottawa: Law Commission of Canada, 1998); Z. Oxaal, "'Removing that which was Indian
from the Plaintiff: Tort Recovery for Loss of Culture and Language in Residential Schools Litigation"
(2005) 68 Sask. L. Rev. 367.
See e.g. D. Dyzenhaus & M. Moran, eds., Calling Power to Account: Law Reparations, and the
Chinese Canadian Head Tax Case (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2005) [Dyzenhaus &
Moran, Calling Power to Account].
6 See e.g. Gerald L. Gall et al., Redress for Past Government Wrongs: Issue Position Paper (Ottawa:
Advisory Committee to the Secretary of State (Multiculturalism) (Status of Women) on Canada's
preparations for the UN World Conference Against Racism, 2001) online: <http://www.pch.gc.ca
/progs/multi/wcar/advisory/redresse.cfm>.
Although the expression "historical wrong" is not used expressly in the following two articles, the idea
that sterilization is a harmful policy of past government shows clearly in them. See Timothy Caulfield
& Gerald Robertson, "Eugenic Policies in Alberta: From the Systematic to the Systemic?" (1996) 35
Alta. L. Rev. 59; and Dwight Newman, "An Examination of Saskatchewan Law on the Sterilization of
Persons with Mental Disabilities" (1999) 62 Sask. L. Rev. 329. Forced sterilization is expressly called
a historical wrong by the court in Muir v. Alberta (1996), 179 A.R. 321 (Q.B.) at paras. 3, 153 [Muir].
See e.g. Eric K. Yamamoto, "Race Apologies" (1997) J. Gender Race & Just. 47; Eric K. Yamamoto,
"Racial Reparations: Japanese American Redress and African American Claims" (1998) 40 B.C.L.
Rev. 477. See also generally, "Case Comment on Arakaki v. Hawaii, 314 F.3d 1091 (9 h Cir. 2002)"(2003) 116 Harv. L. Rev. 2694. On reparations for various forms of historical human injustice around
the world see e.g., Roy L. Brooks ed., When Sorry Isn't Enough: The Controversy over Apologies and
Reparations for Human Injustice, (New York: New York University Press, 1999); Eric A. Posner &
Adrian Vermeule, "Reparations for Slavery and Other Historical Injustices" (2003) Colum. L. Rev.
689.
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I intend to use a definition of "historical wrongs" that encompasses many of the
elements seen in the Canadian literature but is narrower than the interpretation used
in the United States. Although inflicted on one group by another, historical wrongs
in this context will consider only those wrongs imposed by government legislation or
policy. Though this legislation or policy may have been later repealed, it will have
been validly enacted at the time of the initial injuries. Moreover, the impugned
governmental acts or omissions would most likely be considered discriminatory
under contemporary legal standards (i.e. under the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms9 or other domestic human rights legislation), having been directed towards
vulnerable groups in society. These vulnerable groups may also be considered to be
owed a fiduciary duty. "Historical wrongs", in this sense, is therefore used to
describe more than injustice on racial grounds, a ground that is often argued as a
basis for reparations claims both in Canada and elsewhere. Instead, the notion of
historical wrongs, as it is used here, extends to incorporate injustice done to all
vulnerable groups in society. A useful reference point for the idea of a vulnerable
group is subsection 15(1) of the Canadian Charter and its judicial interpretations. 10
Two examples of such historical wrongs will be used for analysis - the system
of Canadian Aboriginal residential schools and the forced sexual sterilization of
mentally challenged children in Alberta. This is not to say that there are no other
illustrations of historical wrongs in Canada." However, these two particular
examples show a fascinating mixture of both court action and compensation schemes
running concurrently. Historical background of both situations is laid out below,
followed by an analysis of the legal and equitable doctrines used in the courts to
address historical wrongs such as these.
1. Aboriginal Residential Schools in Canada
The purpose of Aboriginal residential schools was to assimilate native children into
mainstream Canadian society. Aboriginal children were separated from their
families and sent to boarding schools off the reserves. Aboriginal residential schools
existed actively in Canada between the early 17th century and the mid-1980s. The
last federally-rn school was shut down in 1996.
9 Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. II
[Charter]. Subsection 15(1) of the Charter prohibits discrimination on the following explicit grounds
and on analogous grounds: race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or
physical disability.
10 See e.g. Law v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1999] 1 S.C.R. 497.
An example is the Chinese Head Tax. Surviving Chinese Canadians who had paid the tax in order to
immigrate to Canada and their widows received a formal apology on 22 June 2006 from the Prime
Minister in the House of Commons and compensation of $20,000 each, see House of Commons
Debates, 046 (22 June 2006) at 1513. This mixture of apology and compensation came after
unsuccessful litigation in which the arguments of unjust enrichment and violation of international
human rights standards and the Canadian Charter were all rejected by the courts. See Mack v. Canada
(A.G.) (2001), 55 O.R. (3d) 113 (Sup. Ct.), affd 60 O.R. (3d) 737 (C.A.) [Mack].
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Two main reasons are often given for the attempt to assimilate Aboriginal
peoples in this way. The first deals with the financial responsibility of the federal
government with respect to Aboriginal peoples. The British North America Act of
1867 declared Aboriginal peoples and their lands to be a federal responsibility. 12
This obligation was expanded in 1876 when the Act to amend and consolidate the
laws respecting Indians13 made all Aboriginal peoples wards of the federal
government. The federal government sought to make First Nations people more like
the dominant, non-native Canadian society both economically and culturally. This
included teaching Christian morality and technical skills. Some scholars argue that
through this process of assimilation, the government hoped to minimize, if not
eliminate, its financial and fiduciary obligations for First Nations peoples by having
them move off reserves and into mainstream culture.14 A second reason given for
assimilation is that it would help to alleviate conflicts that had started to arise
between new British settlers, who began to arrive in the 1800s, and First Nations
peoples. 15
Residential schools were first established in New France in the 17th century.' 6
The peak of the residential school period was in the 1930s. These institutions passed
through several stages until they began to be phased out after 1969.17 In total, over
100 000 First Nations children attended residential schools, and the federal
government estimates that there are approximately 80 000 living former students of
the residential school system.' 
8
12 Constitution Act, 1867 (U. K.), 30 & 31 Vict., c.3, s. 91(24), reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, App. II, No. 5
[BNA Act].
S.C. 1876, c. 18 [Indian Act].
14 See e.g. J.R. Miller, "Troubled Legacy: A History of Native Residential Schools" (2003) 66 Sask. L.
Rev. 357 at 365 [Miller, Troubled Legacy]; and Jennifer J. Llewellyn, "Dealing with the Legacy of
Native Residential School Abuse in Canada: Litigation, ADR and Restorative Justice" (2002) 52
U.T.L.J. 253 at 256.
15 See e.g. Llewellyn, ibid.; R. Chrisjohn et al., The Circle Game: Shadows and Substance in the Indian
Residential School Experience in Canada, (Penticton, BC: Theytus Books, 1997); and J.R. Miller,
Shingwauk's Vision: A History of Native Residential Schools, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press,
1996) [Miller, Shingwauk's Vision].
16 There are several excellent overviews of the history of Native residential schools. See Law
Commission of Canada, Restoring Dignity: Responding to Child Abuse in Canadian Institutions
(Ottawa: Law Commission of Canada, 2000) [Law Commission, Restoring Dignity]; Government of
Canada, Report of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples (Ottawa: Indian and Northern Affairs
Canada, 1996) [Government of Canada, RCAP Report] online: <http://www.ainc-inac.gc.ca
/ch/rcap/sg/cge.html>; Miller, Troubled Legacy, supra note 14; and Miller, Shingwauk's Vision,
supra note 15.
17 The Law Commission of Canada reports that in 1931, 80 schools existed across Canada: I in Nova
Scotia; 13 in Ontario; 10 in Manitoba; 14 in Saskatchewan; 20 in Alberta; 16 in British Columbia; 4 in
the Northwest Territories; and 2 in the Yukon. See Law Commission, Restoring Dignity, ibid. at 54.
is See Indian Residential Schools Resolution Canada, online: <http://www.irsr-rqpi.gc.ca>. A total of
approximately 15 000 former students have made claims against the government through both
traditional litigation in the courts and claims made through the government's alternative dispute
resolution process (see Baxter, supra note 2 at para. 13). Approximately 12 000 of these are class
action cases started in Ontario and Alberta. See Parliament of Canada, Official Report of debates
(Hansard), 79 (11 April 2005) (Jim Prentice).
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The residential school system was administered as a joint endeavour by the
federal government and various churches. 19 Although first established by religious
organizations in the 18th century, including various protestant denominations, the
government of Upper Canada began establishing an official system of residential
schooling in the early 19th century. In 1920, the Indian Act was amended to make
attendance in residential schools compulsory for all First Nations children aged
seven to fifteen. In addition to creating the educational policy, the federal
government took charge of funding the schools. The churches operated the schools.
In the 1870s, First Nations groups entered into treaties with the federal
government. First Nations negotiators understood these treaties to have the intention
of creating on-reserve schools that would help the First Nations communities become
self-sufficient .20 However, on-reserve schools were passed over in favour of
residential schools. Some argue that the government's ulterior motive of alleviating
its responsibilities for Aboriginal peoples by assimilating them into mainstream
society is also the reason why it did not respect these treaty obligations. 21 As such,
arguments that the federal government has breached both treaty rights and its
fiduciary duty to First Nations peoples are being used in current litigation
surrounding Aboriginal residential schools.
Over time, former students have revealed that abuse was a central part of the
lives they were forced to lead at residential schools. Forms of abuse included
physical, sexual and psychological abuse. Children were punished for speaking their
language, following their own customs, truancy etc. The stories of survivors show
the line between punishment as a form of discipline and abuse as a form of power
being crossed.22 This abuse is the major part of what has led to litigation and
alternative dispute resolution (ADR) processes, both of which are discussed in more
detail below.
2. Sterilization of the Mentally Disabled in Alberta
Sexual sterilization of the mentally disabled was legislatively sanctioned in Alberta
between 1928 and 1972. The Sexual Sterilization Act 23 allowed for the sterilization
of patients in mental institutions. The decision whether to sterilize was made by a
decision-making board constituted for that purpose. In order to proceed, the board
was to be "unanimously of opinion that the patient might safely be discharged if the
danger of procreation with its attendant risk of multiplication of the evil by
'9 In 1911, the federal government concluded formal contracts with the churches that outlined their
shared responsibilities. See "2. Systemic Neglect: Administrative and Financial Realities" in "10.
Residential Schools", Government of Canada, RCAP Report, supra note 16.
20 See Miller, Troubled Legacy, supra note 14 at 361.
21 Ibid. at 365-66.
22 See e.g. Law Commission, Restoring Dignity, supra note 16.
23 Sexual Sterilization Act, S.A. 1928, c. 37 [Sterilization Act].
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transmission of the disability to progeny were eliminated".24 Once an affirmative
decision had been reached, consent of the individual or substitute consent was to be
obtained before sterilization occurred. Although the language of the Act was
modernized as the statute went through amendments over its 44 years of existence,
the basic idea remained the same - namely, to sterilize mentally disabled persons
who were about to be discharged so that they would not reproduce their "illness".
Over the course of the Act's existence, 2 822 sterilizations were performed.
The Sterilization Act embodied a theory of eugenics that was prevalent in many
parts of North America and Europe at the time.25 The eugenics movement aimed to
foster procreation by groups with desirable characteristics to improve the overall
gene pool and to prevent individuals with undesirable traits from passing them along.
Although the theory and the policies created to further it were popular in the late 19th
and early 20th centuries, over time they increasingly fell to criticism on scientific and
moral grounds.
26
The most significant decision relating to Alberta's sexual sterilization regime is
Muir v. Alberta.27 In Muir, a woman who had been admitted to a training school for
"mental defectives" was able to recover damages for having been wrongfully
admitted to the school and wrongfully sterilized while there. The Muir decision
sparked over 700 additional claims against the government which were eventually
settled through a government designed settlement process. The government had
initially tried to fix maximum compensation awards for sterilization victims through
legislation, but the proposed legislation caused so much controversy that it was
revoked by the Minister of Justice the day after it had been introduced in the
Legislative Assembly.
3. Legal and Equitable Doctrines
Four main doctrines of law and equity are generally attempted by Canadian litigants
seeking redress for historical wrongs before the courts. These are: negligence,
breach of fiduciary duty, application of domestic and international human rights laws
(including the Charter), and if applicable, unjust enrichment. Other actions which
are specific to the situation may also be invoked such as the intentional torts of
assault and battery, and the breach of Aboriginal or treaty rights. This discussion
focuses most heavily on the use and limitations of tort law, especially negligence, in
24 Ibid. s. 5.
25 Sterilization is reported to have occurred during the same time period in various states of the United
States, Sweden, Switzerland, Denmark, Norway, Finland, France, Belgium and Austria. See Dwight
Newman, "An Examination of Saskatchewan Law on the Sterilization of Persons with Mental
Disabilities" (1999) 62 Sask. L. Rev. 329. For an excellent account of the forced sterilization
movement in Sweden and in Scandinavia more generally, see the collection of papers in (1999) 24:2
Scandinavian Journal of History.
26 On Alberta's sexual sterilization regime and the influence of eugenics philosophy see e.g. Caulfield &
Robertson, supra note 7.
27 Muir, supra note 7.
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bringing public authorities to account for historical wrongs, and its interaction with
breach of fiduciary duty.28
(A) Negligence & Breach of Fiduciary Duty
(i) Crown Immunity for Policy-making Discretion
When one thinks of holding public authorities accountable, the use of tort law almost
automatically comes to mind. In particular, negligence - the causing of loss or
damage by failing to meet an appropriate standard of care with respect to one to
whom a duty is owed - is a concept that is theoretically wide enough to encompass
many types of governmental harm. In practice, however, our historical struggles
with delineating the scope of Crown immunity have at times left it difficult to have
state actions that seem patently wrong declared ultra vires. This is particularly the
case when dealing with historical wrongs on the part of the Crown.
There is an inherent intersection between tort and administrative law that
becomes evident when dealing with the liability of public authorities. The nexus
between the two is judicial review, regardless of whether the review is on public or
private law grounds. If judicial review aims to ensure that government behaviour is
legal then it follows that the very fact that a historical wrong has been created
through governmental policy validly made at the time, is the key to why private law
actions in this context fail. More narrowly put, when it comes to holding the
government accountable for the past creation of a discriminatory policy, tort law, and
in particular, negligence, has a predisposition to fail. This is due to the juristic
argument that the government cannot attract liability in its establishment of policy or
legislation. At the very most, it can be held responsible only for negligent
implementation of the policy or legislation created.
Commonly known as the "policy/operational dichotomy", this boundary
represents the idea that government officials are in the best position to make policy
decisions as such decisions involve the balancing of polycentric considerations that
rely on social, political, budgetary, technical and similar factors. The theory goes
that not only are courts inadequately informed to make such judgments, it is also
more appropriate to have decisions of this nature made by officials who are
ultimately answerable to the electorate. 29  By contrast, matters relating to the
execution of a policy, where discretion is narrower and where there may be standards
and fixed resources, are held to be more amenable to review on negligence
28 1 have limited the discussion to tort and fiduciary duty because of the theme of the symposium of
which this paper formed a part. The problems in attempting to apply human rights legislation
retrospectively and in applying the doctrine of unjust enrichment are discussed in both levels of court
in Mack, supra note 11. As with tort law, the problem in holding government to account under human
rights legislation or through unjust enrichment is that the valid law at the time provides a juristic
reason for the government' actions. These questions are explored in Dyzenhaus & Moran, Calling
Power to Account, supra note 5.




principles. As these decisions are more discrete, the application of negligence
principles in their regard theoretically should not involve second-guessing the type of
polycentric decisions made in the policy creation stage. 30  At its core, the
policy/operational dichotomy inevitably turns on a question of degree as policy
implementation often involves elements of policy discretion; this has rendered the
policy/operational dichotomy difficult to apply.
31
Decided in 2005, the Supreme Court of Canada decision in Blackwater v.
Plint32 offers an illustration of the strong degree to which Crown immunity for
policy creation can be upheld by courts dealing with historical wrongs. Plint is one
of the first cases dealing with the merits of governmental liability for residential
schools to have reached the Supreme Court. Both the Supreme Court and the lower
courts' analyses are instructive on how questions relating to Crown immunity will be
understood in the context of historical wrongs.
In Plint, twenty-seven former students of the Alberni Indian Residential School
(AIRS) claimed damages for sexual abuse and other harm suffered while they
resided at the school. 33 AIRS had been established in 1891 to provide elementary
and high school education to Aboriginal children living in remote areas on the west
coast of Vancouver. It was run as a joint venture between the government of Canada
and the United Church of Canada. The government was primarily responsible for
funding and the Church responsible for managing the school in accordance with
regulations and standards prescribed by the government. 34 Particularly interesting is
30 The classic cases applying the policy/operational analysis include: Anns v. Merton London Borough
Council, [1978] A.C. 728 (H.L.); Welbridge Holdings Ltd. v. Winnipeg (Greater), [1971] S.C.R. 957;
Kamloops (City o) v. Nielsen, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 2; Just v. British Columbia, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 1228; and
Brown v. British Columbia (Minister of Transportation & Highways), [1994] 1 S.C.R. 420.
31 See the discussion by Lewis Klar who outlines several cases illustrating the lack of judicial pattern in
determining which matters are policy based and which are operational. See Lewis Klar, Tort Law, 3rd
ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 2003) at 277-82. The policy/operational dichotomy as it exists in the United
States, England, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand is analyzed comparatively and critiqued by
Nicholas W. Woodfield. Woodfield fimds strong similarities in the law in these jurisdictions but
suggests a two-step approach to determining whether immunity should be accorded. See Nicholas W.
Woodfield, "The Policy/Operational Dichotomy in Intra-State Tort Liability: An Example of the Ever-
Continuing Transformation of the Common Law" (2000) 29 Denv. J. Int'l L.& Pol'y 27.
32 Blackwater v. Plint, [2005] 3 S.C.R. 3 [Plint SCC].
33 The trial judgment was rendered in two phases after a 11l day trial. The first set of reasons for
judgment dealt with the issue of vicarious liability for the defendant Plint. The second dealt with all
other liability issues raised, including vicarious liability for perpetrators other than Plint, negligence of
the government and the church, fiduciary duty, non-delegable statutory duty, limitation defences and
the third party claims advanced by the United Church and the government against each other. By the
time of the second judgment, all but seven plaintiffs had settled out of court and the judgment related
only to those remaining actions.
34 This agreement was formalized as one of the standard agreements that the federal government
concluded with all residential schools in 1911. See supra note 19 and accompanying text. The trial
judge found that although it was created to last only five years, the Albemi school continued to operate
under the general principles set out in the 1911 agreement after those years had expired. See the
British Columbia Supreme Court discussion in W.R.B. v. Plint (1998), 52 B.C.L.R. (3d) 18 (Sup.Ct.) at
para. 36 [Plint 1].
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the Supreme Court's way of framing the issues before it. Central to the Court's
inquiry was an unusual exploration of the legal bases on which the federal
government and the United Church could be held liable instead of simply an
examination of whether the dispute showed liability on established doctrinal
principles. McLachlin C.J.C. stated the issues in Plint as follows:
Are the Government and the United Church of Canada ("Church") liable
to Aboriginal students who attended residential schools operated by them
in British Columbia in the 1940s, 1950s and 1960s? If so, on what legal
basis are they liable, and how should liability be apportioned between
them? Finally, what damages should be awarded? These are the central
questions on this appeal.35
Before each level of court, the courts placed compensation for abuse at the
forefront of the analysis. Despite this, however, one cannot help but observe that the
courts were being asked to award damages for something more than the mere
mishandling of a policy put into operation. As the case wound its way through the
courts, the question of whether the government could be held liable for the harm
caused by the actual creation of the residential school policy came up more than
once, although it was always relegated by the courts to being tangential to what they
considered the main issues of assault and abuse. Grappling with this request resulted
in a certain tension and unease as the courts tried to stick firmly to the doctrine of
Crown immunity for policy creation.
The question of the government's potential liability for its residential school
policy made its most forceful appearance at the British Columbia Court of Appeal.
There, it surfaced as a new argument forming part of the appellants' claim for
aggravated damages. Supported by intervenors who had not appeared at first
instance, the appellants argued that the loss of culture they experienced as a result of
being forced to leave their homes and attend at residential schools should be seen as
a factor in fixing aggravating damages for sexual abuse. The Court dismissed this
argument, holding that it was essentially a new cause of action which they could not
address on appeal as it had not been pleaded at trial. Ultimately, the Court of Appeal
found that the claim simply constituted "an attack upon the system of residential
schools and its overall effect on all students. 36  The Supreme Court of Canada
reinforced the principle that government policy in itself is immune from suit.
McLachlin C.J.C. held at the outset of her decision:
A more general issue lurks beneath the surface of a number of the specific
legal issues. ... For example, to what extent is evidence of generalized
policies toward Aboriginal children relevant? Can such evidence lighten
the burden of proving specific fault and damage in individual cases? I
conclude that general policies and practices may provide relevant context
for assessing claims for damages in cases such as this. However,
35 Plint SCC, supra note 32 at para. 1.
36 W.R.B. v. Plint (2003), 235 D.L.R. (4th) 60 (B.C.C.A.) at para. 79 [Plint BCCA].
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government policy by itself does not create a legally actionable wrong. For
that, the law requires specific wrongful acts causally connected to damage
suffered. 3
The British Columbia Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court of Canada
decisions in Plint suggest that even when a government policy has itself resulted in
harm, Crown immunity for discretionary policy-making will be upheld. In Plint, all
levels of court were insistent that the government could only be held liable for the
abuse that the former students suffered because this abuse was a negligent
misapplication of the policy that was to be implemented. However, while the courts
managed to keep the door to Crown immunity guarded in this case, they ultimately
seemed to have left open the possibility of attacking such immunity on the ground of
breach of fiduciary duty.
Over the past few decades, the concept of fiduciary duty has grown to
encompass a very wide array of equitable obligations. Dickson J. (as he then was)
offered a general definition of fiduciary duty in Guerin v. Canada,3 8 one that
incorporates its role in both public and private law contexts. He stated: "...where by
statute, agreement, or perhaps by unilateral undertaking, one party has an obligation
to act for the benefit of another, and that obligation carries with it a discretionary
power, the party thus empowered becomes a fiduciary' 39 . Once a fiduciary duty is
established, equity will then supervise the relationship by holding the empowered
party to "the fiduciary's strict standard of conduct. 4 0  In the public law realm,
fiduciary obligations are commonly used in the context of Aboriginal law.
In Plint, all levels of court discussed the appellants' argument that the Crown
breached its fiduciary duty by creating a policy which led to the loss of their
language and culture. Interestingly, the British Columbia Supreme Court in Plint
had held that what was missing to make this a situation in which a breach fiduciary
duty could be found was evidence of dishonesty or an intention on the part of the
Crown to act in its own benefit. 4' Neither the British Columbia Court of Appeal nor
or the Supreme Court of Canada overturned this proposition.4 2 An interesting
question remains as to whether a window of opportunity has been left open for future
plaintiffs to show dishonesty by arguing that the government's self-interest in
37 Plint SCC, supra note 32 at para. 9.
38 Guerin v. Canada, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 335.
39 ibid at 384.
40 Ibid.
41 See W.R.B. v. Plint (2001), 93 B.C.L.R. (3d) 228 (Sup. Ct.) [Plint 2] at paras. 246-48.
42 The British Columbia Court of Appeal simply did not embark upon an analysis of the question. It
agreed with the legal test and with the trial judge's holding. See Plint BCCA, supra note 36 at para.75.
The Supreme Court of Canada noted that since the issue had not been argued fully at the lower levels
of court, it could not address it. See Plint SCC, supra note 32 at para. 62.
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eliminating its financial responsibility for First Nations communities led it to breach
its fiduciary obligations.4 3
As a means of getting beyond the policy/operational dilemma, some theorists
argue for a wider and more morally based interpretation of cases in which Crown
immunity is invoked. Lome Sossin argues that the question of governmental liability
for past public policies would be better addressed through a "public trust" analysis."
His theory understands public authority as an exercise of public trust in which the
Crown is made up of "public decision-makers, bound to discharge the public trust
reasonably and fairly". 45 This approach proposes the blending of equitable doctrines
with traditional private law or public law judicial interpretations. It works to some
extent by expanding the use of fiduciary obligations in our public law jurisprudence.
The concept of public trust involves recognizing and using a spectrum of equitable
obligations suited to a variety of relationships - legal, constitutional and
administrative - that exist between the Crown and the citizens affected.46 Once it
can be agreed that a particular policy was unjust, the public trust analysis focuses the
inquiry on the context in which it was implemented and the consequences of the
policy for the aggrieved parties. The public trust theory aims to pierce the legalistic
formalism that results in cases where Crown immunity is upheld without questioning
the fairness and reasonableness of the state's actions. Underlying Sossin's theory
seems to be the notion that it is the legitimacy of the policies created that merits
owing deference to the Crown; yet, legitimacy, and by extension, the right to
immunity cannot be adequately evaluated without reference to the fairness and
reasonableness of the policy made.
Others, like Julian Rivers, suggest that statutes that are grossly unjust can be
declared invalid by judges because they lack a certain moral correctness which is
necessary to the normal course of legal reasoning.47 The substantive content of what
constitutes "grossly unjust" and the amount of injustice required before a statute can
be struck are matters for each jurisdiction's legal system to work out. Rivers draws
inspiration from the theories of German legal philosophers, Gustav Radbruch and
Robert Alexy in developing this theory.48 Even if these approaches are adopted,
however, one still faces the challenge of deciding whether to use standards of the
time period or contemporary ones in determining if the policy created was grossly
unjust.
43 See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
" See Lorne Sossin, "Redress for Unjust State Action: An Equitable Approach to the Public/Private
Distinction" in Dyzenhaus & Moran, Calling Power to Account, supra note 5 at 196.
45 See Sossin, ibid. at 216.
46 ibid. at214-15.
47 See Rivers, supra note I at 239.
48 See also the critique of the Radbruch formula by David Dyzenhaus, "The Juristic Force of Injustice" in
Dyzenhaus & Moran, Calling Power to Account, supra note 5.
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It is also clear that some plaintiffs may seek redress precisely for the negligent
or otherwise unsanctioned behaviour of the public officials acting under a valid
governmental scheme. The sexual sterilization case of Muir may be an example. In
Muir, there was no indication that damages were sought for the eugenics policy
itself. Rather, negligence law was used to claim damages that arose when the
government officials allowed Ms. Muir to be admitted to the training school without
following their own procedures, and for sterilizing her when there was no
consideration of discharge, contrary to the statute. Although the policy behind the
statute was not attacked, it is applaudable that the case itself caused so much social
uproar that the government apologized for the eugenics regime and began to offer
compensation. However, the litigation approach taken did little to question the
policy/operational divide.
Equally important is that many plaintiffs and others still conceive of the
reparation of wrongs as containing a very traditional corrective justice component:
damages received are, at least in some part, to place the members in the group in the
position they would have been in had the wrong not occurred.4 9 This factor coupled
with the amount of people who must be compensated when a community or group is
affected by a historical injustice leads to a tension between satisfying the individual
and the collective.
Finally, if there is truly sovereignty in policy and legislative-making functions,
then why not use them to redress the effects of historical wrongs? It may be argued
that the courts are not in the position to question political action but certainly the
political branches of government should be able to do so. Better use could be made
of administrative compensation schemes to address historical wrongs.
PART II: Administrative Compensation Schemes
We have seen the degree to which the notion of government immunity for policy and
legislative functions will be upheld. It is very difficult to find a way to hold
government liable for the creation of past policy or legislation that has caused lasting
significant injury. The historical notion that the "King can do no wrong" has
remained steadfast by way of the policy/operational divide. 50 On the other hand,
when it comes to creating governmental administrative programs to compensate for
historical wrongs, it seems that the executive and legislative branches of government
are well-placed to overcome the policy/operational dichotomy. By using policy, they
can attempt to redress the effects of programs the Crown has created in the past.
4 On the viability of reparations claims as tort suits in the U.S. see Alfred L. Brophy, "Reparations Talk:
Reparations for Slavery and the Tort Law Analogy" (2004) B.C. Third World L.J. 81; and Keith N.
Hylton, "A Framework for Reparations Claims" (2004) B.C. Third World L.J. 31.
Although this expression is used to discuss the dichotomy in tort law, it equally informs the failure of
other legal and equitable strategies that have been attempted to hold public authorities accountable,
such as the use of human rights law and unjust enrichment. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
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However, at least two broad tensions have surrounded the creation of
compensatory schemes in Canada for historical wrongs. These are: i) determining
the appropriate nature and amount of compensation. In part, this first tension is a
question of finding the right balance between compensating according to the heads
and amount of damages available in the courts and offering compensation beyond
this scope and ii) managing issues of independence and mistrust that may arise from
having a future incarnation of the author of the historical wrong provide the remedy.
Setting up methods to deal with these tensions in advance and revisiting them as
necessary as the compensation project unfolds may allow for smoother
implementation of compensation policies. Both the residential schools resolution
process and the settlement plan instituted for the Alberta sterilization compensation
show the value of one method: keeping an open door to dialogue with those
affected. They suggest that the establishment of a compensation process, far from
being static, requires the fluidity of continuing discussion to gain legitimacy. They
also suggest that the mistrust sometimes experienced by users of the compensation
process may, in some circumstances, best be addressed by independent oversight.
Finally, on a meta-level, the policy instruments that have been designed to provide
compensation, such as the ADR Process for Native residential school abuse claims
and the Settlement Plan for sterilization victims in Alberta, raise interesting questions
about the new dimension that these instruments add to traditional forms of
administrative law and justice.
1. The Nature of Redress
How do we determine appropriate redress? In light of the various historical wrongs
and types of redress instruments possible, this is a large question with several
potentially viable answers. The methods of redress offered for historical wrongs
around the world present quite a varied list. The most common types of redress
include apology, truth and reconciliation commissions, commemorative initiatives,
rehabilitative or restorative initiatives and of course, monetary compensation. These
forms of redress have been offered separately or in conjunction with one another. In
Canada, several groups have sought redress for historical wrongs. 51 Table A in the
5' This includes redress for:
* leprosy patients imprisoned between 1891 and 1956 on two islands around Victoria B.C.;
* the Black Loyalists;
* the destruction of Africville and the relocation of its residents in 1969;
* Canada's denial of entry to Jews between 1938 and 1948;
* Aboriginal war veterans denied benefits;
* Ukrainian Canadians interned during World War I;
* German Canadians interned during World War 11 (1940 to 1943);
* Italian Canadians interned during World War I1;
* Japanese Canadians interned during and after World War II;
* Chinese Canadians subject to the Chinese Head Tax;
* former students of aboriginal residential schools;




Appendix outlines the nature and amount of redress that successful groups have
received.
The choice to redress a historical wrong with any particular instrument(s) should be
crafted from the factual details of the wrong committed, respond to its effects and
further a genuine intention of remedying, to the extent possible, the harm that has
been suffered by the individuals, their community and the wider Canadian
community. This section is not intended to present a comprehensive list of factors to
consider in determining appropriate redress or to declare any instrument as
definitively necessary. Instead, focusing primarily on compensation as a form of
redress, this section aims to identify some of the key issues that have arisen in the
development of past compensation processes for historical wrongs and to discuss
these issues as possible areas of examination in the creation of future administrative
compensation projects.
2. Determining Appropriate Heads of Damage
In some instances, federal and provincial governments offering compensation have
tried to stay within the parameters of compensation for which they would be liable
through civil litigation. These parameters have been followed for both the heads of
damage awarded and the amount of compensation provided.
As an example, the current Indian Residential Schools Alternative Dispute
Resolution Process (ADR Process) is very clear to emphasize that it will provide
compensation only for the ancillary, negative effects that former students have
suffered, such as abuse.52 In this regard, the official guide to the ADR Process
specifies that there are only three types of claim that it will consider - physical
abuse, sexual abuse and wrongful confinement. 53  Moreover, Indian Residential
Schools Resolution Canada, the federal government ministry responsible for the
program, further clarifies that "wrongful confinement" in this context does not refer
to the very fact of being forced to attend these schools. The term is used only to
designate being detained in an inappropriate space during the time that the student
was at the school:
In the Alternative Dispute Resolution Process, you can make a claim for
compensation for sexual abuse, physical abuse or wrongful confinement
you suffered at a residential school. In this process, wrongful confinement
means being kept against your will and alone in a space where both the
space and length of time were not appropriate for a child of your age...54
52 The official document governing the dispute resolution process is the Guide for the Alternative Dispute
Resolution Process. Indian Residential Schools Resolution Canada, "Guide for the Alternative
Dispute Resolution Process", Indian Residential Schools Resolution Canada, online: <http://www.irsr-
rqpi.gc.ca/english/pdf/Application-Guide.pdf>. Note that this ADR process will soon be replaced with
an Independent Assessment Process that is very similar. Further discussion of the Independent
Assessment Process is found below.
5 Ibid. at 1.
4 Ibid. at l.
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This approach keeps quite closely within the doctrine that governmental
liability for improper implementation of a government policy is acceptable while
liability for creation the policy itself is not. The federal government received
criticism from several angles over the fact that its original process did not even
attempt to provide for the loss of language and culture that former students endured.
The federal government gave two responses. The first was based on a parsing out of
the amount of reparations by form, which allowed them to say that other programs
address this issue. Specifically, they pointed to an initiative to preserve, revitalize
and protect Aboriginal languages and cultures that they had already established. 55
Their second response was to indicate that the courts have not yet granted damages
for such loss and that if they do so in the future, the ministry may consider the
issue.56 The problem with their arguments, particularly the first one, is that loss of
language in culture has both a collective component and an individual component.
While the grant of money given for preservation of culture may address the
community's loss of language and culture that resulted from the Aboriginal school
legacy, it does not speak to each individual's loss of language and culture that
resulted from his or her forced attendance at a residential school. The current ADR
Process, which was designed as an alternative to court and aimed, in theory, to be
more tailored to an understanding of the Aboriginal residential school experience,
does not provide the litigant with compensation for the very real and significant loss
suffered.
It is perhaps not surprising that the ADR Process led to lobbying and
consultation. Dissatisfied with the process because of its inability to deal with key
issues such as loss of language, culture and harm to future generations, the Assembly
of First Nations 57 supported by the Canadian Bar Association, 58 lobbied the federal
5 The government statement is as follows:
The Resolution Framework is for people claiming sexual and/or physical abuse as a
result of their experiences at Indian residential schools. It does not address claims
based on the loss of language and culture. The federal government is currently
implementing a 10-year $172 million initiative to work with Aboriginal people to
preserve, revitalize and protect Aboriginal languages and cultures for all Aboriginal
people, reinforcing at the same time Canada's commitment to address the full range
of impacts stemming from the Indian residential schools system.
Indian Residential Schools Resolution Canada, "Resolution Framework & ADR", Indian Residential
Schools Resolution Canada, online: <http://www.irsr-rqpi.gc.ca/english/dispute-resolution_
resolution framework.html>.
56 See Ken R. Halvorson, Indian Residential School Abuse Claims: A Lawyer's Guide to the Adjudicative
Process (Toronto: Carswell, 2005) at 5.
57 See Assembly of First Nations, "Report on Canada's Dispute Resolution Plan to Compensate for
Abuses in Indian Residential Schools" Assembly of First Nations - Assemble des Premieres Nations,
online: <www.affi.ca/cmslib/general/Indian-Residentia-Schools-Report.pdf> [Assembly of First
Nations, "Report on Canada's Dispute Resolution Plan"]. The document lays out the elements of
discontent as well as the aspects that the Assembly found to be more positive in the government's ADR
process.
5 See Canadian Bar Association, "Resolution 04-08-A Scope of Residential Schools Dispute Resolution




government for much more comprehensive compensation. As a result, in May 2005,
the Honourable Frank Iacobucci, a retired Justice of the Supreme Court of Canada,
was appointed by the Government of Canada to be its federal representative in
negotiations with legal counsel for former students, legal counsel for the churches
and other interested parties, most notably, the Assembly of First Nations. The aim of
the negotiations was to seek a fairer, long-lasting resolution to the residential schools
legacy. The idea for the negotiations came at a time when there were several claims
outstanding, both in the regular courts and in the government's ADR Process.
59
Negotiations took place with the Honourable Frank Iacobucci over a period of
approximately one year. The result was an Agreement that aims to be a global
solution which ameliorates the ADR Process and provides a settlement plan for all
outstanding class action and other residential school litigation.60
The Agreement offers to pay a Common Experience Payment to each former
resident of an Indian residential school living on 31 May 2005. The payment
represents an acknowledgment of the fact of having lived at an Indian residential
school and the impacts of this experience, including loss of language and culture.
Once put into effect, each former student would receive $10 000 for the first year of
residence in the school and $3 000 for each subsequent year upon proof of his or her
attendance. As a term of its implementation, the Agreement must be ratified by
courts in nine Canadian jurisdictions under substantially the same terms and
conditions. In December 2006, the nine courts in question sanctioned the
settlement 61; however, some courts asked for modifications to be made within sixty
59 At the time of writing his judgment in Baxter, Winkler J. noted approximately 15 000 ongoing claims
proceeding through traditional court and the government's ADR processes. See Baxter, supra note 2
at para. 13.
60 An Agreement in Principle was reached on 23 November 2005. A copy of the Agreement in Principle
can be found on the website of the federal representative for Indian residential schools: Federal
Representative - Indian Residential Schools, "Agreement in Principle" The Office of the Federal
Representative, online: <http://www.iacobucci.gc.ca/english/pdf/AIP English.pdf>. The final
Settlement Agreement is also available: Federal Representative - Indian Residential Schools, "Indian
Residential Schools Settlement Agreement" The Office of the Federal Representative, online:
<http://www.iacobucci.gc.ca/english/pdf/Indian-Residential-Schools-Settlement-Agreement.PDF>.
61 In addition to the Ontario class action in Baxter, supra note 2, parallel proceedings were filed and
heard in eight other Canadian jurisdictions: Alberta, British Columbia, Manitoba, Northwest
Territories, Nunavut, Quhbec, Saskatchewan and the Yukon. Counsel both urged and gave consent to
the courts of the nine jurisdictions to communicate with each other in reaching their decisions. The
degree to which they acceded to this request is reflected in their judgments. All the decisions were
rendered in mid-December except for the decision of the Northwest Territories Superior Court which
was issued on 15 January 2007. See: Northwest v. Canada (A.G.) 2006 ABQB 902; Quatell v. Canada
(A.G.) 2006 BCSC 1840; Semple v. Canada (A.G.) 2006 MBQB 285; Kuptana v. Canada (A.G.) 2007
NWTSC 1; Ammaq v. Canada (A.G.) 2006 NUCJ 24; Baxter, supra note 2; Bosum c. Canada (A.G.)
(15 December 2006) Montrdal 500-06-000293-056 (C.S.); Sparvier v. Canada (A.G.) 2006 SKQB
533; Fontaine v. Canada (A.G.) 2006 YKSC 63.
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days of the decision in order for the settlement to be finally approved 62 . The nine
courts gave final approval in March, 2007.63 Eligible survivors are currently being
asked to either opt out of the class action or submit the request for payment. Once
this is done, the Common Experience Payment will be distributed and the rest of the
settlement will be put into place.
A couple of lessons can be drawn from the Indian residential school
compensation experience. The first is the importance of flexibility in designing a
compensation scheme in order to create one that genuinely reflects the harm that has
been sustained. With the residential schools, loss of language and culture on an
individual basis was a central part of the injuries suffered by the claimants. Yet, the
original process adhered so closely to the heads of damage and the philosophy of
Crown liability as found in the regular courts that it failed to provide adequate
compensation. As an adjunct to flexibility, keeping an open ear to consultation with
those affected is also essential.
3. The Dual Role of Author-Master in the Compensation Process
Consultation is one means of gaining legitimacy in developing a compensation
process for historical wrongs. Paying attention to the actual injuries suffered as they
are described by the claimants is one way to help ensure authenticity in the
compensation offered. But, in light of the fact that it is the government, a future
iteration of the author of the historical wrong, who has agreed to pay the
compensation, other concerns of legitimacy between the claimant and the payer may
also arise. One, in particular, deals with overcoming an almost inherent mistrust
that a victim and others, including the general public, may feel when the author of
the wrong turns into the master of the compensation process. Two examples
illustrate different ways in which this mistrust can arise. First, the settlement plan
concluded by the federal government and counsel for residential schools exhibited
some definite problems in the way that it would be administered. The courts, in
ratifying the settlement plan, were quite vigilant in pointing out these administrative
deficiencies. I outline these deficiencies and the mistrust that they raised through a
discussion of Winder J.'s decision in Baxter. The second example is more subtle. It
draws from an analysis of the Hansard debates in the Alberta Legislature that took
place on the day that the Alberta government tried to introduce a bill that would limit
the amount of compensation that sexual sterilization victims could receive. These
examples reinforce the idea that even the slightest appearance of potential self-
interest can cause trust to break down in a compensation process. This problem
62 The federal government also appealed one of these decisions on a question relating to lawyers fees
which may also have delayed final approval, although the federal government maintains that it did not
do so. For opposing views on the matter see: Mark Hume "Abuse payout, legal fees separate issues,
chief says" The Globe and Mail (13 February 2007) S2; and Government of Canada, "Government of
Canada News Release: Minister Prentice Provides Update on the Indian Residential Schools
Settlement Agreement", online: <http://www.classactionservices.caILRS/PDFs/Settlement%20
Agreement%20Update%2OJan%2031%20EN.PDF>.




becomes even more acute when the government offers simultaneously the
alternatives of a compensatory process to victims and the option of litigation.
(A) Conflicts of Interest in the Implementation of Compensation Processes
As discussed above, a global resolution for all Aboriginal residential school litigation
was sought through a settlement plan that would put into effect an agreement
between the federal government and former students. The settlement has been
ratified by the nine Canadian courts in question although some courts requested
modifications to the administration of the process. The main concern that inspired
modification was the fact that the federal government was to play, simultaneously,
both the role of respondent in its ongoing litigation with former students and
administrator of the settlement. Without a clear demarcation between the two roles,
the federal government could be perceived to be in a conflict of interest.
In its capacity of administrator of the settlement, the government would
determine the eligibility of former students to receive the Common Experience
Payment and distribute payments to eligible applicants. It would also run the
Independent Assessment Process, establish a Truth and Reconciliation Commission
and set aside a significant portion of the settlement fund for healing and
commemorative programs. 64 In a manner similar to the existing ADR Process, the
Independent Assessment Process would adjudicate claims for abuse but with the
promise of resolving such claims much more quickly.
In Baxter, the Ontario Superior Court of Justice was concerned that there may
be the appearance of direct or indirect influence by the government on the
implementation and administration of the settlement. The Court insisted that the
government's litigation interests should not be apparent through its administration of
the settlement; otherwise, it would be difficult to ensure that the interests of the
claimants were genuinely being met.65 To achieve the appearance of independence
and neutrality, Winkler J. suggested a total separation of the government's
administrative and litigation functions.66 He insisted that the person appointed by
4 The Government of Canada indicates that it will provide:
* $60 Million for the establishment of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission and research
centre;
* $20 Million for a Commemoration program for events and memorials to commemorate the
legacy of Indian Residential Schools, to be managed by the Government in conjunction with
the Truth and Reconciliation Commission;
* $125 Million as an endowment to the Aboriginal Healing Foundation to continue to support
healing programs and initiatives for a further five years; and
* $100 Million in cash and services toward healing initiatives, to be contributed by the Church
entities involved in the administration of Indian Residential Schools.
See "Frequently Asked Questions" on the Indian Residential Schools Resolution Canada website:
Indian Residential Schools Resolution Canada, "Independent Assessment Process" Indian Residential
Schools Resolution Canada, online: <http://www.irsr-rqpi.gc.ca/english/questions.html#tc3>.
65 See Baxter, supra note 2 at paras. 37-38.
66 Ibid. at para. 38.
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the federal government to administer the settlement report ultimately to the courts
and not to the government. He also suggested that once appointed, this person not be
subject to removal by the government without further approval from the courts.
These problems were remedied in the final settlement.
67
A similar concern had been expressed in the earlier decision of Cloud v.
Canada (A.G.). 68 The issue in Cloud was whether a proposed class action could be
certified. The Ontario Court of Appeal, in deciding to certify the class action, had
expressed concern over the fact that the ADR Process had been set up unilaterally by
the federal government and could theoretically be dismantled unilaterally by it as
well. In this way, the ADR Process could not be seen as a viable or preferable
alternative to a class action proceeding.
69
(B) Conflicts of Interest in the Development of Compensation Processes
Providing redress by government initiative may also give the impression that
the government is favouring inappropriate factors such as cost efficiency over a
genuine attempt to compensate individuals fairly. One finds a vivid example of this
in the Alberta sterilization case. In 1998, the Conservative government aimed to
limit the amount of compensation available to individuals who chose to seek
damages in the civil courts for what had been done to them under the Sexual
Sterilization Act and similar statutes enacted to deal with "mental defectives". To do
this, the government introduced a Bill in the Legislature that prescribed the
maximum amount of compensation that the Alberta courts could award a plaintiff
seeking compensation. The proposed legislation, Bill 26, Institutional Confinement
and Sexual Sterilization Compensation Act, 199870 capped the amount of damages at
$150 00071 and was based on the government's study of the average amount of
damages that was being awarded in similar actions across the country. The
government was prompted to take this route by the success of the Muir decision.
72
At the time that it introduced Bill 26, there were approximately 700 outstanding
cases dealing with sterilization and institutional confinement. 7
67 Although these issues were addressed in the Court's final order, the Court seems to have directed more
attention to ensuring that the reporting functions show no conflict than to the question of the
administrator's removal. See the final approval order regarding implementation: Fontaine et al. v.
Canada, Ont Sup. Ct., 00-CV-192059CP, (8 March 2007), (unreported), online: <http://www.
classactionservices.ca/IRS/documents/ORDER4ONTMARI 607.pdfb.
68 Cloud v. Canada (2004), 73 O.R. (3d) 401 (C.A.) [Cloud].
69 Ibid. at paras. 91-92.
70 2d Session, 24th Leg., 1998 [Bill 26].
7 ibid. ss. 4(3), 5(1). It was also proposed that damages awarded in relation to sterilization and other
related and legislatively authorized acts not be less than $5 000.
72 See Alberta, Legislative Assembly, Alberta Hansard, 803 (10 March 1998) at 781 (Hon. Ralph Klein).
73 Ibid. at 779 (Mr. Havelock).
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There was significant uproar in the Legislature when the Bill was introduced.
Although the Conservative government touted it as a way of establishing
compensation principles that would assist in resolving claims in a fair, expeditious
and consistent manner , many members of the Legislative Assembly saw the
Conservative's plan as nothing but a means of limiting the compensation that victims
could otherwise validly receive. The concerns were grounded in a perception that
the government was trying to remove the right of litigants to obtain fair
compensation in the courts. It was true that one could still go to the courts to obtain
redress; however, the amount that could be obtained had been circumscribed.
Moreover, the Charter and the Alberta Bill of Rights75 had been overridden,
preventing constitutional and quasi-constitutional challenges to the proposed Bill.76
Proponents of the Bill argued that the Bill would allow the claimants to resolve their
claims quickly without having to endure lengthy constitutional battles. Given that
many of the claimants were elderly, working expeditiously was to be a positive
factor. The Bill's proponents also maintained repeatedly that the proposed statute
would be fair both to claimants and to "the interests of all Albertans". 77 But this
latter argument was interpreted to imply an inappropriate privileging of cost
efficiency for taxpayers over fair compensation for the victims.
78
Opponents of the Bill were outraged by its goals. One member framed the
proposed Bill as a form of inappropriate interference with the judiciary by the
legislature. 79 This point may be arguable as, on a technical level at least, courts are
to interpret and apply the will of the legislature. Nonetheless, the point remains that
if the legislature is supposed to represent the voice of the people, the main group
affected here, namely, the sterilization victims themselves, had not been consulted
prior to the introduction of the Bill. Moreover, many found the constitutional
override to be simply a second stripping of constitutional rights from a vulnerable
group that had already been attacked through the initial sterilization legislation.8 °
Finally, there was a general implication of disingenuousness on the part of the
Conservative government. It seemed to be using its legislative power in order to win
cases that had been validly brought before the courts, and doing so by limiting what
the courts could offer so that the judicial remedy suited what the government, as
respondent, would be prepared to give. As a result of the clear and loud expressions
of disapproval that the Conservative government received, it decided to revoke the
Bill the next day in the Legislature. The Minister of Justice stated that the
government had instead decided to use the parameters of Bill 26 to negotiate
compensation settlements with the sterilization victims and to leave alone the
victims' choice to proceed through the courts.
74 Ibid. at 775 (Mr. Havelock).
" R.S.A. 1980, c. A-16.
76 Bill 26, supra note 70, s. 3.
77 See Alberta Hansard, supra note 72 at 775, 779, 781, 782 (Mr. Havelock).
78 In this regard, see ibid. at 782 (Mr. Sapers).
79 Ibid. at 780 (Ms. Barrett).
so See e.g., ibid.; and Alberta, Legislative Assembly, Alberta Hansard, 811 (11 March 1998).
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In June 1998, approximately two months after the Bill had been withdrawn, the
government announced that 500 of the remaining claims had been settled through
negotiations between the government and a trustee appointed to represent
sterilization victims. 81  For the remaining 250 to 300 outstanding claims, the
government instituted a settlement plan through which claimants could apply in
order to attempt negotiations with the government. If negotiations failed, the
claimants could ask to have their cases reviewed by a Settlement Panel, composed of
five distinguished Albertans. This panel was authorized to provide settlements of up
to $150 000 for sterilization and confinement, or settlements of up to $300 000 if the
victim's life had been significantly affected "through exceptional circumstances".
82
The process was entirely voluntary for the claimants and they retained the option of
bringing court action if settlement could not be reached through negotiation or the
Settlement Panel. In the end, the vast majority of the claims were settled through
this settlement process.83
These two examples, taken from the proposed administration of the settlement
for the residential schools and from the Alberta sexual sterilization compensation
process, illustrate some of the ways that conflict and mistrust can be perceived when
the author of the wrong turns into the master of the compensation process. It is clear
that mistrust of the government runs deeper than the actual process that is being
created. Mistrust originates as a result of the human rights violation itself. It is
compounded by any perception that the government's motivation to provide
compensation stems from anything other than a genuine attempt to correct the harm
done. Likely, the most effective solution involves having some sort of oversight by a
body that is independent of the compensation process itself. One possible oversight
body could be the judiciary playing a similar role to the one it generally has under
provincial class proceedings legislation84 , where it gives ultimate direction for the
administration of the process. Another solution could be to have the matter of
compensation examined by an independent parliamentary committee composed of
81 See Government of Alberta, "Government of Alberta News Release: Government announces
settlements for 500 sexual sterilization claims" Government of Alberta (5 June 1998), online:
<http://www.gov.ab.ca/acn/199806/6368.html>.
82 See Government of Alberta, "Government of Alberta News Release: Settlement Panel for Sterilization
Claims Announced" Government of Alberta (21 October 1998), online: <http://www.gov.ab.ca
/acn/199810/6888.html>. The expression "exceptional circumstances" is not defined in the news
release. Since the settlements are not public, it is also not possible to see how the expression was
defined and in what circumstances the additional $150 000 was awarded. The base amount of $150
000 is the same amount that had been proposed as a maximum in Bill 26.
83 See Government of Alberta, "Government of Alberta News Release: Stratton Agreement concludes
sterilization negotiations" Government of Alberta (2 November 1999), online:
<http://www.gov.ab.ca/acn/19991l/8353.html> [Government of Alberta, "Stratton Agreement"]. At
the time of producing this news release, the Justice Department reported there were fewer than twenty
outstanding claims. The Alberta Justice Department anticipated resolving these claims shortly. See
also Government of Alberta, "Government of Alberta News release: Government Settles another 40
Sterilization Claims" Government of Alberta (27 October 1998), online: <http://www.gov.ab.ca
/acn/199810/6913.html>. This is the only other news release on the issue of the sterilization settlement
plan available from the Alberta Justice Department.
8 See e.g. Ontario's Class Proceedings Act, 1992, S.O. 1992, c. 6.
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parliamentarians and lay persons who would hear evidence from interested members
of the public. The parliamentary committee would then be responsible for the
introduction of the compensation process through legislation or other means, and for
its enforcement.
4. Determining the Appropriate Amount of Compensation
It is generally understood by complainants and the public that while the award of
money to a victim of a historical wrong is termed "compensation", it can never truly
offset the harm that the victim has suffered.85 The payment of money is in many
senses symbolic. 86 Yet, even if the payment is symbolic, it is surprising to observe
the often wide variances in amounts offered in compensation packages by Canadian
federal and provincial governments. For instance, for wrongful institutionalization
and abuse, the Quebec government has paid Duplessis orphans a generalized lump
sum of $10 000 each plus $1 000 for each year spent in an asylum. For wrongful
institutionalization and sterilization, the Alberta government has made individualized
assessments and payments, awarding a total amount that averages out to $202 000
per claimant. It is hard to deny that both the abuse and sterilization suffered by each
of these groups had very distinct impacts on each and every individual involved.
Despite the obvious issues of federalism allowing each province the freedom to
determine how to deal with such matters within its own jurisdiction, the difference in
the nature and amounts of compensation given for two analogous incidents, leads to
the identification of a few key questions that any government deciding to award
compensation for a historical wrong must address.
A primary question is whether to award compensation on an individualized
basis or to provide a standard lump-sum to each recipient. This issue may turn on
the amount of time that has elapsed since the wrong occurred and whether victims
will easily be able to recount their stories for an individualized assessment. If a long
period of time has elapsed or if the trauma is extremely painful, it may be difficult
for victims to tell their stories and undesirable to ask them to do so. At the same
time, in some instances, it may be the wish of the victim to have his or her story told.
The question of elapsed time may relate also to the age of the population of
victims. In many instances, including Aboriginal residential schools, the Chinese
Head Tax case and Alberta sexual sterilization, many recipients of the compensation
85 In this regard, the Assembly of First Nations (AFN), "Report on Canada's Dispute Resolution Plan",
supra note 57 at 17-18 has a very thoughtful definition of the term "compensation". The AFN's
definition locates the meaning of compensation within different contexts with the consequence that the
term has different significance depending on whether one is in a tort action, an altemative dispute
resolution, a settlement, etc. The AFN goes as far as to indicate that they do not expect tort law
compensation in the context of a dispute resolution process.
86 There are, of course, other reasons for providing money, particularly in tort law, the most relevant of
these being deterrence. While deterrence may be a goal of tort law in some circumstances, and may be
a possible objective in the case of historical wrongs, it is not a primary goal for claimants seeking
monetary recompense. In the few court cases that address historical wrongs, the idea of deterrence is
rarely mentioned.
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are elderly. A concern in such cases is to be able to compensate these victims before
they pass away. A standard lump-sum which does not require individual
assessments may be best to achieve this goal.
A related and perhaps larger question is how to determine the quantum of the
award. Should the award be based on damages that a victim could receive in court,
as was done in the Alberta sterilization case? Or should other methods such as
likening the award to a type of insurance-like payment or to a remedy from a tribunal
be used? If the choice is to use a court action, other questions that arise include
whether the remedy should be based on those found in a tort action or in a Charter
action. There are clearly numerous ways to determine these and other factors in
deciding on the appropriate quantum of a compensation award. However, federal
and provincial governments in Canada are not always open about the factors taken
into consideration and how they are weighed. 7  This has led to public confusion
about the relative "merit" of various lump sums awarded for historical over time.88
CONCLUSION
Compensatory Schemes for Historical Wrongs: A New Form of Administrative
Justice?
Redress for historical wrongs is a subject to be treated with tenderness. The poor
regard for human rights sanctioned by governmental legislation is shocking in
retrospect. We have undoubtedly progressed as a society in recognizing past human
rights violations. Yet, it is with frustration that we watch courts apply formalistic
legal tests based on the distinction between government "policy" and "operation" to
uphold traditional protection of the former at the expense of those who have suffered.
Although understood with a doctrinal legal ear, it is difficult to appreciate that
society has progressed to change these laws but that the Crown cannot be asked at
law to pay for its part of past social mistakes. This is even more difficult to
appreciate when one considers that the Crown is continuous - remaining the same
even though it represents itself through different government parties over time.
Seeking to hold the Crown liable in tort is sometimes considered to be a newer
form of administrative justice. But interestingly, the various compensatory schemes
created by the government for redress of historical wrongs form an even more
modern and innovative category of administrative justice. What distinguishes this
87 It is interesting to compare the general lack of information provided to Canadians in determining
compensation for historical wrongs with the approach taken in some other countries. For example, in
Sweden, the amount of compensation given for forced sterilization of the mentally disabled was
determined by a parliamentary committee after report by an investigator. The investigator's report is a
public document which outlines the factors taken into consideration in determining the monetary
amount of compensation to be given to each victim. See The Swedish Government Official Reports
1999:2, Steriliseringsfrdgor i Sverige 1935-1975 - Ekonomisk ersdtning (Sterilization Questions in
Sweden 1935-1975 - Economic Compensation), online: <http://www.regeringen.se/sb/d/I08/a/22620>,
summary in English at 29-50.
88 See e.g. Roy MacGregor "Why the fate of Maher Arar reminds another Canadian of his years of
freedom lost" The Globe and Mail (29 January 2007) A2.
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category is the lack of a statutory basis for the processes put in place. While the
majority of processes we encounter in administrative law are established by statute,
initiatives such as the residential schools resolution system and the Alberta
Sterilization Settlement Plan seem to be forms of government-initiated contract.
However, despite the absence of a statute or orders-in-council, these processes share
many typical administrative justice values.
While at one time administrative law's concept of justice focused primarily on
keeping the executive within legal bounds, this Diceyan notion of reigning in
discretion has seen a few new core elements develop alongside it. Efficiency and
expediency are two of these more recent hallmarks of the administrative justice
system along with simplified processes developed and used to provide access to
justice to a wider range of citizens. Used in conjunction with the expertise of
decision-makers in processes that are often less adversarial than the courts, these
simplified processes aim to help resolve disputes with the government and others in a
faster, less expensive way.89  Many compensation processes set up by the
government share these core elements - certainly, we have seen them in the
residential schools resolution system and the Alberta Sterilization Settlement Plan.
In these two examples the ideas of simplified processes, reduced expense for the
claimant, efficiency and expediency in rendering compensation, as well as
adjudicators who are sensitive to the nature of the wrong and the harms that it has
caused, are central goals.
This recent group of governmental compensation schemes challenges our
traditional understandings of administrative law by forcing us to consider the ways
and at the extent to which judicial review will be possible. It is very likely that
lawyers will resort to the use of the traditional prerogative remedies in seeking
judicial review of these compensatory schemes; yet, Canadian jurisprudence exhibits
a dearth of cases in which non-statutory public bodies have been brought to task
through the use of these remedies. The few cases that exist have dealt only with the
remedy of certiorari.90 Mandamus, or the forcing of a public official to do what he
or she is obliged to do, seems like a very useful judicial review remedy in cases of
historical wrongs and it will be interesting to see if it and the other prerogative
remedies will serve to be useful as well as the standards of review that will apply.
Placed within the issues that arise in developing such governmental initiatives -
including questions of legitimacy, trust and mistrust and determining appropriate
methods and amounts of redress - governmental compensatory programs to provide
89 Although goals of expediency and expertise often clash within the administrative state. See Laverne
Jacobs, "Developments in Administrative Law: The 2004-2005 Term" (2005) 30 Sup. Ct. L. Rev.(2d)
43. On the importance of expediency and access to justice in the administrative justice context see
Ontario Agency Reform Commission, Everyday Justice: Report of the Agency Reform Commission on
Ontario's Regulatory and Adjudicative Agencies (Toronto: Queen's Printer for Ontario, 1998).
90 See Masters v. Ontario (1993), 16 OR. (3d) 439; Volker Stevin N.W.T. ('92) Ltd. v. Northwest
Territories (Commissioner), [1994] N.W.T.J. No.7; Scheerer v. Waldbillig (2006), 265 D.L.R. (4th)
749 and McDonald v. Anishinabek Police Service et al. (2006), 83 OR. (3d) 132.
[VOLITOME 57]
[2007] RECONCILING TORT & ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 159
redress for historical wrongs lead us to question, on somewhat of a meta-level, what
the eventual contours of this new form of administrative justice might be.
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Table A
Brief Overview of Canadian Redress for Historical Wrongs
Apology Commemorative Compensation Rehabilitative/
initiatives restorative
initiatives
Aboriginal X $20 million $10,000 per $225 million in
Residential upon implementation student for initial healing initiatives,
Schools of Settlement year of residence plus $60 million to
Agreement in school plus establish a truth and
$3,000 for each reconciliation





Aboriginal X X $39 million X
war veterans offered; up to
$20,000 to
surviving veterans




Chinese In House of X $20,000 to each X
Canadians Commons by living head tax
Prime payer or to the
Minister, spouses of
22 June 2006 deceased payers
Duplessis Apology by X $26 million - X
Orphans Quebec $10,000 per
(Qc) Premier orphan plus $1,000
Bernard for each is a
Landry additional year
(1999) spent in an asylum
(2001)
91 Most do not see the "Statement of Reconciliation" offered in 1997 (see Minister of Indian Affairs and
Northern Development, "Statement of Reconciliation" in Gathering Strength: Canada's Aboriginal
Action Plan (Ottawa: Minister of Public Works and Government Services Canada, 1997)) as a formal
apology and would like the government to formally apologize for the Aboriginal residential school
legacy. See e.g. CBC News "Atlantic chiefs seek apology for former residential school students" (26
March 2007) , online: <http://www.cbc.ca/cp/Atlantic/070326/tO32619A.html>. On I May 2007, the
House of Commons unanimously approved a motion to apologize to the residential school survivors.
The motion was brought by the opposition, Liberal government. The Conservative majority
government indicated, however, that the government of the day (the executive branch of government)
thought it best to wait until after the truth and reconciliation commission that it is in the process of
establishing, completed its work, before issuing an apology. See Parliament of Canada, Official
Report of debates (Hansard), 144 (1 May 2007) (Gary Merasty).
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92 The settlement with the Japanese Canadians was historic at $300 million. In addition to the amounts
and types of redress given in the table, a further $12 million was given to establish the Canadian Race
Relations Foundation. This foundation was created to foster racial harmony and cross-cultural
understanding and to help eliminate racism; Canadian citizenship was given to Japanese Canadians
lead been expelled from Canada and $3 million was put into community liaison administration of
redress claims.
93 The News Release statement of this state provides the most expansive expression of regret; see
Government of Alberta, "Stratton Agreement", supra note 83. The Alberta government had made a
more hermetic expression of its regret earlier in the Legislature at the time of revoking Bill 26, see
Alberta, Legislative Assembly, Alberta Hansard, 811 (11 March 1998) at 812-13 (Mr. Havelock).
Italian X $2.5 million and X X
Canadians additional provisions




Japanese In House of $12 million to $21,000 for each $12 million to
Canadians 92  Commons by commemorate those eligible individual Japanese Canadian




Sterilization Alberta X $142 million X
of mentally Department
disabled of Justice 2
(AB) November
1999 9
Ukrainian X $2.5 million X X
Canadians
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